Key Takeaways
- • Squad-value financing advances roughly 25% of an estimated squad value to clubs over 6–24 months, typically secured on the club's whole balance sheet rather than only the unsold players, according to the Financial Times report of 15 October 2026 as summarized in the primary analysis.
- • The leading provider is a 50/50 joint venture between Tifosy Capital & Advisory and Fasanara Capital, which manages over $6bn mainly for pension funds, insurers, banks and endowments; 23 Capital has relaunched with squad-value lending as a core offering.
- • Publicly reported pricing clusters at 8–16%, with Genoa's Tifosy-arranged loan at "almost 11%", Burnley's reported range at 7.25%–12%, and Apollo's 8.75% Nottingham Forest facility, several hundred basis points above secured bank finance.
- • The IFR draft State of the Game report (13 October 2026) finds 94% of clubs loss-making and transfer financing rising from £55m to £779m in four years, which the author argues adds a speculative layer to an already heavily encumbered system.
- • The product sits in regulatory gaps: it provides no profit for Squad Cost Ratio compliance, lending to a company is generally not FCA-regulated, and the IFR licensing regime is not yet in force to capture it.
Summary
Squad-value financing lets an English or European football club borrow against the estimated market value of its registered players, including players not yet sold. According to the Financial Times report of 15 October 2026, discussions over such loans are increasing among English clubs and lenders, and clubs in Spain, Portugal, Italy, France and Belgium have already used the structure. Burnley is cited as among the few English clubs to have used loans sized partly against player valuations and secured on a broader asset pool, with Fasanara Capital holding charges created on 15 January 2025 that cover all property, including Turf Moor.
The lending is high-cost and short-tenor. Fasanara's sports loans run six to 24 months with tickets of $10m–$50m, and the FT's anonymous executive described the use case as buying in January and repaying from summer sales. The only loan-level pricing in the public domain clusters at 8–16%. The contractual terms of any squad-value loan to an English club have not been disclosed, so pricing is inferred from comparables, including Everton's Rights and Media Funding facilities at base rate plus 5% and Ares's reported 11–16% to Eagle Football.
The author, Paul Quinn of CWTE Limited, argues that the product is best understood as secured debt sized against a modelled asset value rather than a transfer of risk. The club remains fully liable if a player sells below the modelled value or the sale does not occur, and the collateral moves with performance: relegation, injury or loss of form reduce squad value just when a sale is needed. The analysis also notes that the loans encumber future transfer income counted as a liquid asset under the Premier League's new Sustainability and Systemic Resilience test, and that Saudi clubs spent $407m on international transfers in summer 2026, their lowest since 2023.
The paper draws parallels with pre-2008 credit practices, including mark-to-model collateral, repayment dependent on rising asset prices, and migration to lightly supervised lenders, while stating the scale is far smaller and currently non-systemic. The author concludes that boards and the IFR should require disclosure, loan-to-value discipline and stress-testing before the product scales. The IFR report remains a consultation draft open until 8 December 2026.
The lending is high-cost and short-tenor. Fasanara's sports loans run six to 24 months with tickets of $10m–$50m, and the FT's anonymous executive described the use case as buying in January and repaying from summer sales. The only loan-level pricing in the public domain clusters at 8–16%. The contractual terms of any squad-value loan to an English club have not been disclosed, so pricing is inferred from comparables, including Everton's Rights and Media Funding facilities at base rate plus 5% and Ares's reported 11–16% to Eagle Football.
The author, Paul Quinn of CWTE Limited, argues that the product is best understood as secured debt sized against a modelled asset value rather than a transfer of risk. The club remains fully liable if a player sells below the modelled value or the sale does not occur, and the collateral moves with performance: relegation, injury or loss of form reduce squad value just when a sale is needed. The analysis also notes that the loans encumber future transfer income counted as a liquid asset under the Premier League's new Sustainability and Systemic Resilience test, and that Saudi clubs spent $407m on international transfers in summer 2026, their lowest since 2023.
The paper draws parallels with pre-2008 credit practices, including mark-to-model collateral, repayment dependent on rising asset prices, and migration to lightly supervised lenders, while stating the scale is far smaller and currently non-systemic. The author concludes that boards and the IFR should require disclosure, loan-to-value discipline and stress-testing before the product scales. The IFR report remains a consultation draft open until 8 December 2026.
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